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International Court of Justice, July 13, 2009
On July 13, 2009, the International Court of Justice delivered its judgment in the case
between Costa Rica and Nicaragua concerning navigational and related rights on the lower
course of Nicaragua’s San Juan river1 —that portion of the river subject to the terms of Arti-
cle VI of the April 15, 1858, Treaty of Limits, or Jerez-Can˜as Treaty (1858 Treaty), which cre-
ates certain Costa Rican navigational rights on parts of the San Juan (see map prepared by ICJ).
Costa Rica initiated this case on September 29, 2005, with an application requesting the Court
“to adjudge and declare that Nicaragua is in breach of its international obligations . . . in deny-
ing to Costa Rica the free exercise of its rights of navigation and associated rights on the San
Juan River” (para. 12, quoting application). Costa Rica sought to found jurisdiction on the
parties’ declarations under Article 36(2) of the Court’s Statute, the 2002 Tovar-Caldera Agree-
ment, and Article XXXI of the Pact of Bogota´ (para. 1). Nicaragua did not contest the Court’s
jurisdiction.
In a lengthy dispositif (para. 156), the Court found “that Costa Rica has the right of free
navigation on the San Juan river for the purposes of commerce,” including the transport of
passengers and tourists; that those persons need not obtain a Nicaraguan visa or purchase a
tourist card; that “the inhabitants of the Costa Rican bank of the . . . river have the right to
navigate between the riparian communities for the purposes of the essential needs of everyday
life which require expeditious transportation”; and “that Costa Rica has the right of navigation
. . . with official vessels used solely . . . to provide essential services for [those] inhabitants.”
Costa Rica’s navigational rights do not cover either “vessels carrying out police functions” or
“navigation . . . for the purposes of the exchange of personnel of the [Costa Rican] police bor-
der posts . . . [or ] of the re-supply of these posts, with official equipment, including service
arms and ammunition.” As for Nicaragua’s right to regulate Costa Rican navigation on this
portion of its river, the Court found that “Nicaragua has the right to require Costa Rican vessels
. . . to stop at the first and last Nicaraguan post on their route . . . ; . . . to require persons . . .
1 Dispute Regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v. Nicar.) (Int’l Ct. Justice July 13, 2009). The
basic documents, decisions, pleadings, transcripts, press releases, and other materials for this case and others are
available on the Court’s Web site, http://www.icj-cij.org.
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to carry a passport or an identity document; . . . to issue [but not to charge for] departure clear-
ance certificates . . . ; . . . to impose timetables for navigation . . . ; . . . [and] to require Costa
Rican vessels . . . to display the Nicaraguan flag.” Nicaragua was “not acting in accordance with
its obligations under the 1858 Treaty when it” required persons to obtain Nicaraguan visas and
purchase Nicaraguan tourist cards, and when it charged for departure clearance certificates.
Finally, the Court found “that fishing by the inhabitants of the Costa Rican bank of the San
Juan river for subsistence purposes from that bank is to be respected by Nicaragua as a cus-
tomary right.”
The Court based its decision primarily on the 1858 Treaty,2 Article II of which fixed the
course of the entire land boundary between the parties. Physical demarcation of the boundary
occurred between 1897 and 1900. The effect of Article II and the subsequent demarcation
exercise was to place the eastern third of the boundary along the right (or Costa Rican) bank
of the lower course of the San Juan River from a point three miles downstream from Nicara-
gua’s Castillo Viejo to the mouth of the river on the Caribbean coast at the Bay of San Juan
del Norte, thus leaving the river itself in Nicaraguan territory. Article VI of the 1858 Treaty
created an exception affirming for Costa Rica “a perpetual right of free navigation” for certain
purposes on the lower course of the San Juan River (para. 44, quoting Court’s translation of
Article VI of the 1858 Treaty). The exact contours of this exception and the limitations that
it created on Nicaragua’s exercise of sovereignty were at issue in this case. The parties did not
2 Provisions of the 1858 Treaty were the subject of two arbitration awards: the March 22, 1888, arbitral award
made by the president of the United States and the September 30, 1916, decision of the Central American Court
of Justice. The Court, however, found that neither award settled the questions at issue in this case (para. 49). It may
be noted that in the instant case, Costa Rica urged the Court also to consider “the rules of general international law
that are applicable . . . to navigation on ‘international rivers’ ” (para. 32). The Court found it unnecessary to take
a position on whether “there exists, in customary international law, a re´gime applicable to navigation on ‘interna-
tional rivers’ ” or “whether the San Juan falls into the category of ‘international rivers’ ” (para. 34). Instead, “the
1858 Treaty of Limits completely defines the rules applicable to the section of the San Juan river that is in dispute
in respect of navigation” (para. 36).
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dispute the location of their boundary. It should be noted that the navigational aspects of the
1858 Treaty and the decision in this case do not apply to the upper course, or nonboundary
portion, of the San Juan river, both banks of which are in Nicaraguan territory.
While expressly recognizing Nicaragua’s sovereignty over the San Juan River, Article VI of
the 1858 Treaty also limited that sovereignty by creating conditional navigational rights for
Costa Rican vessels. The Court’s English translation of Article VI reads as follows:
The Republic of Nicaragua shall have exclusive dominium and imperium over the waters
of the San Juan river from its origin in the lake to its mouth at the Atlantic Ocean; the
Republic of Costa Rica shall however have a perpetual right of free navigation on the said
waters between the mouth of the river and a point located three English miles below
Castillo Viejo, [con objetos de comercio], whether with Nicaragua or with the interior of
Costa Rica by the rivers San Carlos or Sarapiquı´ or any other waterway starting from the
section of the bank of the San Juan established as belonging to that Republic. The vessels
of both countries may land indiscriminately on either bank of the section of the river
where navigation is common, without paying taxes, unless agreed by both Governments.
(Para. 44)3
The bulk of the Court’s judgment focused on “determin[ing] the extent of Costa Rica’s right
of free navigation on the San Juan river” and then on “ascertain[ing] whether, and to what
extent, within the ambit of the right thus defined, Nicaragua has the power to regulate nav-
igation by Costa Rican boats and whether the specific measures [instituted] during the period
of the dispute are compatible with Costa Rica’s rights” (para. 29).
The extent of Costa Rica’s right turned on the phrase “con objetos de comercio,” which mod-
ified and limited Costa Rica’s “perpetual right of free navigation.” Nicaragua interpreted this
phase narrowly, translating it as “with articles of trade,” thus giving a concrete meaning to obje-
tos (that is, physical objects or goods) and limiting comercio to the purchase and sale of those
goods or merchandise (paras. 45, 58). Costa Rica interpreted the phrase broadly, translating
it as “for the purposes of commerce,” thus giving an abstract meaning to con objetos de (that is,
for the purpose of ) and allowing comercio broad scope to include “not only the transportation
of goods but also the transport of passengers, including tourists” (para. 45). The Court turned
first to an analysis of con objetos de and then to comercio to define the exact extent of Costa Rica’s
right of free navigation.
Standing alone, objetos could have either the concrete or abstract meaning argued by the par-
ties. The Court therefore examined the provision’s context and, applying a literal analysis to
the text of Article VI, found that only Costa Rica’s abstract interpretation of con objetos de (as
“for the purposes of ”) would give the sentence coherent meaning in view of the immediately
following clause, “whether with Nicaragua or with the interior of Costa Rica” (para. 52). This
interpretation was supported by the abstract use of the word objetos in Article VIII of the same
Treaty (para. 54), the use (one year earlier) in the 1857 “Can˜as-Martinez” Peace Treaty of the
phrase “artı´culos de comercio” to indicate “articles” or “goods” of commerce (para. 55), and the
use by both parties of the translation “for the purposes of commerce” in their 1887 submissions
before the arbitration by U.S. President Cleveland, which considered other aspects of the 1858
Treaty (para. 56).
3 The authoritative Spanish version of Article VI is reproduced at paragraph 43.
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The Court then turned to a more involved analysis of the meaning of comercio. Costa Rica
argued that comercio included, at a minimum, “any activity in pursuit of commercial purposes”
and that it extended to not-for-profit activities, including “movement and contact between
inhabitants of the villages on the Costa Rican bank” and “navigation by Costa Rican public
officials providing the local population with essential services” (para. 59). Observing that Costa
Rica’s broad interpretation provided no limitation on the right of free navigation and that it
would therefore render the language con objetos de comercio without effect, the Court did not
accept Costa Rica’s interpretation.
Nicaragua argued that comercio was limited solely to “the purchase and sale of merchandise”
(para. 58), and supported this contention, in part, with “the assertion that ‘commerce’ should
be given the narrow meaning it had when the Treaty was entered into” (para. 62). The Court
disagreed. While noting that it is “the parties’ common intention” at the time of concluding
the Treaty that guides the interpretation of terms used in the Treaty, “there are situations in
which the parties’ intent upon conclusion of the treaty was . . . to give the terms used . . . a
meaning or content capable of evolving” (para. 64).4 According to the Court, “where the par-
ties have used generic terms, . . . and where the treaty has been entered into for a very long
period . . . , the parties must be presumed, as a general rule, to have intended those terms to
have an evolving meaning” (para. 66).5 Here, the Court found both a generic term—comer-
cio—and a perpetual legal re´gime, and concluded that “it is the present meaning which must
be accepted for purposes of applying the Treaty” (para. 70).
Applying the present meaning of comercio to navigational activities on the lower course of
the San Juan River, the Court found that Costa Rica’s rights under Article VI included “car-
rying passengers who pay a price . . . in exchange for the service” (para. 73). Although the com-
mercial navigation contemplated in Article VI is generally carried out by private vessels, the
Court allowed that official or public vessels navigating for the purposes of commerce would
also be covered, the decisive factor being the purpose of the navigation.
The Court found two additional types of navigation, one private and one public, would be
permitted to Costa Rica: first, “for the Costa Ricans living on [the Costa Rican] bank a minimal
right of navigation for the purposes of continuing to live a normal life in the villages along the
river” (para. 79), and second, navigation by “Costa Rican official vessels . . . used solely for the
purpose of providing [the riparian] population with what it needs in order to meet the neces-
sities of daily life” (para. 84). The Court inferred these rights not from Article VI, but “from
the provisions of the Treaty as a whole, in particular from the fixing of the boundary along the
river bank” (id.).
Having determined the contours of Costa Rica’s navigational rights in accordance with Arti-
cle VI and the Treaty as a whole, the Court turned to Nicaragua’s power to regulate that
4 Here the Court articulated the possibility of a contemporaneous intent to create an evolutionary meaning,
meshing the two interpretive approaches. Judge ad hoc Guillaume expanded on the Court’s past practice of
l’interpre´tation “contemporaine” versus l’interpre´tation “e´volutive” in his declaration (see paras. 8–16) appended to
the judgment, ultimately agreeing with the Court’s interpretation of the term comercio, but for different reasons.
5 For a critique of the Court’s interpretation of the term comercio in this case, see Marko Milanovic, The ICJ and
Evolutionary Treaty Interpretation, EJIL TALK! ( July 14, 2009), at http://www.ejiltalk.org/author/guestcontrib
utor/page/3/.
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navigation.6 Before addressing specific Nicaraguan regulations, the Court laid out five generic
characteristics of permissible Nicaraguan regulation:
(1) it must only subject the activity to certain rules without rendering impossible or sub-
stantially impeding the exercise of the right of free navigation;
(2) it must be consistent with the terms of the Treaty, such as the prohibition on the uni-
lateral imposition of certain taxes in Article VI;
(3) it must have a legitimate purpose, such as safety of navigation, crime prevention and
public safety and border control;7
(4) it must not be discriminatory and in matters such as timetabling must apply to Nic-
araguan vessels if it applies to Costa Rican ones;
(5) it must not be unreasonable, which means that its negative impact on the exercise of
the right in question must not be manifestly excessive when measured against the pro-
tection afforded to the purpose invoked. (Para. 87)
The Court also concluded that Nicaragua was obligated to notify Costa Rica of regulations
affecting Costa Rica’s navigation rights. This obligation did not, however, include a duty to
provide prior notice to, or to engage in consultation with, Costa Rica (para. 97).
Costa Rica challenged specific Nicaraguan regulations, which the Court divided into six cat-
egories: regulations that required Costa Rican vessels or individuals aboard those vessels to (1)
stop at Nicaraguan posts and identify passengers;8 (2) obtain departure clearance certificates;9
(3) obtain Nicaraguan visas or purchase tourist cards; (4) pay fees for departure clearance cer-
tificates, visas, and tourist cards; (5) operate according to the Nicaraguan timetable for nav-
igation;10 and (6) fly the Nicaraguan flag.11 The Court considered each category of regulation
primarily in light of the “reasonableness” balancing test embodied in the fifth characteristic
listed above, and found that four of the six categories of Nicaraguan regulations were “in con-
formity with the 1858 Treaty” (para. 133) and therefore permissible. In contrast, the Court
found that requiring Nicaraguan visas was “a breach of the Treaty right [of free navigation]”
(para. 115), that requiring tourist cards served no legitimate purpose (para. 119), that charging
fees for departure clearance certificates without providing a service to boat operators was
“unlawful” (para. 123), and that charging fees for visas and tourist cards was also impermissible
since Nicaragua had no power to require the underlying documents (para. 120).
As a final substantive matter, the Court considered the question of subsistence fishing in the
San Juan River by inhabitants of the Costa Rican bank. The parties agreed that there was a long-
standing practice of subsistence fishing by the riparian inhabitants, but disagreed whether this
6 All navigation outside the scope of Costa Rica’s right of navigation as provided for in the 1858 Treaty is subject
to Nicaragua’s “complete power of regulation” (para. 85).
7 [Author’s note: In subsequent paragraphs the Court added environmental protection to the list of legitimate
purposes (see paras. 88–89).]
8 Considered in paragraphs 103–07, this category was found to be not unreasonable (see para. 106).
9 Considered in paragraphs 108–10, this category was found to be for legitimate purposes, with the regulations
imposing no significant impediment to Costa Rica’s navigational rights (see para. 109)
10 Considered in paragraphs 125–29, this category of regulation was not proven by Costa Rica to be unreasonable
(see para. 128).
11 Considered in paragraphs 130–32, this regulation did not impose an impediment to navigation (see para.
132).
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practice created an obligation binding on Nicaragua (para. 141). The Court concluded that
Nicaragua must respect, as a customary right, subsistence fishing by the inhabitants of the
Costa Rican bank conducted from that bank, but not from vessels in the river (para. 144). The
Court rejected all other submissions presented by the parties (see paras. 145–56).
* * * *
The Court’s interpretation of Article VI of the 1858 Treaty, while of central importance to
the neighborly interactions of Costa Rica and Nicaragua on the lower course of the San Juan
river, is not of broad import beyond the confines of this case and these parties. The two aspects
of the decision not based on Article VI, however, could have broader relevance for relationships
between neighboring riparian states and for individuals living in riparian border areas: (1) the
Court’s findings regarding minimal rights of navigation by, or on behalf of, inhabitants of the
Costa Rican bank; and (2) the Court’s finding regarding customary rights of subsistence fishing
by those same inhabitants. It is worth noting that, on the facts of this case, these parts of the
Court’s decision concern only a small group of persons: approximately 450 individuals,
approximately half of whom are Nicaraguan (para. 98).
The Court acknowledges that the minimal rights of navigation enjoyed both by the riparian
inhabitants and by Costa Rica navigating on their behalf are “not guaranteed by Article VI of
the Treaty” (para. 84). That is, they do not constitute navigation for the purposes of commerce.
Not falling within the Article VI exception, it seems these rights would be excluded by the clear
language of Article VI, which gives Nicaragua exclusive sovereignty over the territory consti-
tuted by the San Juan River. Nonetheless, the Court found the existence of this additional nav-
igational exception on the basis of “the historical background to the conclusion of this Treaty”
(para. 79), “the Treaty’s object and purpose” (id.), “the geography of the area” (id.), and “the
provisions of the Treaty as a whole, in particular from the fixing of the boundary along the river
bank” (para. 84, emphasis added). Ostensibly the result of interpreting the specific text and
context of the 1858 Treaty, this part of the decision may be applicable beyond this particular
treaty relationship insofar as the same ingredients—a boundary delimited along a bank inhab-
ited by individuals whose normal life includes transportation along the river for lack of a more
expeditious option—are present elsewhere. Judge ad hoc Guillaume, in a noncomprehensive
list, noted eight international boundary relationships that involve a boundary delimited on a
river bank (Declaration, para. 6). In fact, sections of as many as twenty-five international
boundaries are delimited along river banks, totaling approximately four thousand kilometers
of international river bank boundary.12 Although the Court found it unnecessary to consider
whether a regime of customary international law exists for the navigation of international riv-
ers, and if it did, what rules that regime might contain (para. 36),13 one wonders whether the
right of riparian inhabitants to navigate for certain limited purposes might be included.14
12 Email communications between author and coordinator of the International River Boundaries Database, John
W. Donaldson, Senior Research Associate, International Boundaries Research Unit, Durham University, Durham,
UK ( Jan. 11 & Feb. 2, 2010).
13 Judge ad hoc Guillaume argued that no such customary international law regime exists (see Declaration, para.
3).
14 Judge ad hoc Guillaume characterized this minimal right of navigation as a matter of custom, not treaty, albeit
custom deduced in the teeth of treaty language to the contrary: “Elle semble avoir renonce´ a` fonder cette solution
sur une coutume contra legem qui au surplus n’est pas e´tablie” (Declaration, para. 19).
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With respect to subsistence fishing—the other aspect of the decision with possible relevance
beyond the lower San Juan River and the only issue in the case unrelated to navigation—Costa
Rica requested the Court to rule that Nicaragua had violated “the obligation to permit riparians
of the Costa Rican bank to fish in the River for subsistence purposes” (para. 14). In the oper-
ative paragraph the Court found “that fishing by the inhabitants of the Costa Rican bank of
the San Juan river for subsistence purposes from that bank is to be respected by Nicaragua as
a customary right” (para. 156). In so finding, the Court found a duty opposable to Nicaragua,
but it remains unclear who holds the corresponding right15 and, more importantly for riparian
states and individuals elsewhere, how the obligation arose and became binding on Nicaragua.
Language found in the judgment indicates that the Costa Rican state is the titleholder of the
right of subsistence fishing.16 Notwithstanding that language, it is reasonable to conclude on
the basis of the language of the operative paragraph, other language in the decision,17 the con-
text in which the issue was raised by Costa Rica (see para. 140; Sep. Op., Sepu´lveda-Amor, J.,
para. 23), the history and nature of the relevant practice,18 and the nature of the right itself that
the individual riparian inhabitants, not the Costa Rican state, are the actual, beneficial owners.
Under this reasoning the “customary right” is not a sovereign right but, instead, a traditional,
privately held, usufructuary right to capture the fish in the lower course of the San Juan River,
a right held by some or all of the approximately 450 individuals, regardless of nationality, living
along the Costa Rican bank of the San Juan River, and a right with which, in any event, Nic-
aragua may not interfere except in order to regulate that fishing “for proper purposes” (para.
141).19 Moreover, the right should not be conceived of as one arising from a rule of customary
international law, but instead as an acquired or vested right held by individuals by virtue of their
long-standing use of the resource.20 Here, the relevant rule of customary international law does
not create the fishing right but is, instead, a rule operating in the background of the Court’s
15 The Court spoke to this issue in its consideration of Nicaragua’s visa requirement:
Under Article VI of the Treaty the titleholder of the right of free navigation is Costa Rica. Owners and oper-
ators of Costa Rican vessels benefit from that right when navigating on the San Juan river for commercial pur-
poses. Passengers on vessels exercising Costa Rica’s right of free navigation also benefit from that right, even
if such passengers are not Costa Rican nationals. (Para. 114)
16 “The Court accordingly concludes that Costa Rica has a customary right” (para. 141, emphasis added).
17 “Accordingly, the Court concludes that fishing by the inhabitants of the Costa Rican bank of the San Juan river
for subsistence purposes from that bank is to be respected by Nicaragua as a customary right” (para. 144).
18 Costa Rica does not appear to have made any claim of state practice, and it is difficult to conceive of the practice
of subsistence fishing by a small number of individuals in a remote border area as being anything other than private
in nature and without the imprimatur of government.
19 Elsewhere, this kind of right has been called a “traditional right.” See, e.g., Gov’t of Sudan v. Sudan Peoples’
Liberation Movement/Army (“Abyei Arbitration”), paras. 748–66 (Arb. Trib. July 22, 2009) (reported by Coalter
G. Lathrop at 104 AJIL 66 (2010)); Eritrea v. Yemen, Second Stage, Maritime Delimitation, 22 R.I.A.A. 335,
para.108 (Perm. Ct. Arb. Dec. 17, 1999), reprinted in 40 ILM 983 (reported by W. Michael Reisman at 94 AJIL
721 (2000)).
20 In his separate opinion (para. 20), Judge Sepu´lveda-Amor criticized the Court’s reasoning in respect of sub-
sistence fishing for deviating from its “previous findings on the recognition of rules of customary international law.”
Although the word “customary” is used in the decision, there is no indication that the Court sought to find a rule
of customary international law in the global sense: the Court did not purport to have found universal state practice,
much less opinio juris, to support such a rule, and did not indicate that the effect of any such rule would extend
beyond the parties to this case. Sepu´lveda-Amor provided an alternative legal theory to support the Court’s finding
here: “namely the principle of acquired or vested rights” (Sep. Op., para. 28). This alternative basis for the Court’s
finding on subsistence fishing is much more persuasive than, and in no apparent conflict with, the Court’s own
reasoning.
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decision—namely, a customary international law rule that the traditional rights of local pop-
ulations must be respected by the sovereign in whose territory those rights are exercised.21
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PROSECUTOR v. OMAR HASSAN AHMED AL BASHIR. Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09-73. Judgment on
the Appeal of the Prosecutor Against the “Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a War-
rant of Arrest Against Omar Hassan Ahmed Al Bashir.” At http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/
doc817795.pdf.
International Criminal Court, February 3, 2010.
In March 2009, a pretrial chamber of the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued a warrant
for the arrest of Sudanese President Omar Hassan Ahmed Al Bashir to stand trial in the ICC for
crimes against humanity (murder, extermination, rape, torture, and forcible transfer) and war
crimes (intentionallydirectingattacksagainst thecivilianpopulationor individualcivilians, andpil-
lage).1 Thepretrial chamber, ina2-1decision,declinedto includethecrimeofgenocide inthearrest
warrant because the prosecutor had not submitted sufficient evidence concerning genocidal intent
on the part of the accused; in particular, the existence of such intent was not the only reasonable
conclusion that could be drawn from the evidence and other information submitted. In a separate
and partly dissenting opinion, Judge Anita Uaˇcka argued that at the arrest warrant stage, the infer-
ence of mens rea was not required to be the only reasonable conclusion that could be drawn from
the facts presented; instead, all that is required was that the evidence provide reasonable grounds to
believe that the crimes were committed with genocidal intent.
The prosecutor appealed the pretrial chamber’s decision to exclude genocide from the
charges to be brought against Al Bashir.2 In a judgment of February 3, 2010, the appeals cham-
ber upheld the appeal, finding that the pretrial chamber had erroneously applied the prescribed
standard of proof in deciding not to authorize an arrest warrant for genocide (paras. 33–39).3
At that stage, the appeals chamber asserted (adopting basically the same analysis as Judge
Uaˇcka’s partial dissent), the question is not whether a person’s having acted with genocidal
21 See Sep. Op., Sepu´lveda-Amor, J., paras 28–30 (quoting Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia
(1926); Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (1992); and Land and Maritime Boundary Between Cam-
eroon and Nigeria (2002)); see also Gov’t of Sudan v. Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement/Army (“Abyei Arbi-
tration”), para. 753 (“The jurisprudence of international courts and tribunals as well as international treaty practice
lend additional support to the principle that, in the absence of an explicit prohibition to the contrary, the transfer
of sovereignty in the context of boundary delimitation should not be construed to extinguish traditional rights to
the use of land (or maritime resources).”).
1 Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09-3, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for a Warrant
of Arrest Against Omar Hassan Ahmed Al Bashir (Mar. 4, 2009). Materials on ICC situations, including that in
Darfur, Sudan, are available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/SituationsandCases/Situations/.
2 See Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09-12, Prosecution’s Application for Leave to Appeal the
“Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest Against Omar Hassan Ahmed Al Bashir” Dated
4 March 2009 (Mar. 13, 2009); Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09-21, Prosecution’s Application
for Leave to Appeal the “Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for Leave to Appeal the ‘Decision on the Pros-
ecutor’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest Against Omar Hassan Ahmed Al Bashir’ ” ( June 24, 2009).
3 Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09-73, Judgment on the Appeal of the Prosecutor Against
the “Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest Against Omar Hassan Ahmed Al Bashir”
(Feb. 3, 2010).
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